

21 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 21 April 1969

ADD/I reported that General Steakley, JCS Deputy Director for Reconnaissance, has asked all unified and specified commands plus DIA to review the value of reconnaissance activities.

ADD/I noted that the NSC will meet on Friday to consider Middle East problems, with the Review Group meeting on the same topic tomorrow.

In response to the Director's question, ADD/I reported that the NSC will not consider OEP matters on Wednesday. The Director asked him to double-check this information.

*Godfrey noted that per Mr. Kissinger's request they are preparing indications papers two times daily. He noted the risks involved in meeting artificial deadlines. After some discussion the DD/P stated that he will clarify the requirement and seek relief in a conversation with Colonel Haig.

Godfrey reported that there will be a meeting today at Charles University to determine whether student manifestations are to be extended throughout Czechoslovakia.

Godfrey called attention to Joe Alsop's column in today's Washington Post entitled "Soviet Marshals Prime Movers in Winter's Return to Prague." There was considerable discussion about the validity of Alsop's interpretations, and the Director asked that we continue to give the Czech situation close and careful attention ("pay attention to our knitting").

Godfrey reported that the Soviet helicopter carrier Moskva has entered the Mediterranean from the Black Sea.

D/ONE noted that NIE 11-13-69 will be considered on Thursday and that it contains no detailed information on future collection

capabilities. The Director noted receipt of a suggestion from Dr. McLucas similar to that raised by General Thomas (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 15 April) and observed that Dr. McLucas now understands why we are not including details on collection systems.

D/ONE recalled mention at the 11 April Morning Meeting of the disappearance of Soviet troops in the May Day parade staging area and reported that, according to Ambassador Thompson's sources, it is possible that May Day festivities will not include military participation.

DD/S reported that a new brochure of Presidents of the United States on Intelligence will be issued shortly and will contain President Nixon's remarks. Black-and-white photos of the President's visit will be made available free to employees who happened to be photographed with the President.

Carver noted the unfortunate crash of a C-47 in Vietnam carrying four cabinet ministers and a Philippine official.

Maury reported that [redacted] briefing of Senator Jackson Saturday on the Czech situation had gone well.

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Maury reported that Bill Miller is apparently an applicant for a staff assistant position on the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A lengthy discussion followed on who exercises various approvals of security clearances for Congressional staff assistants. DD/S noted that DOD acts as executive agent, and Maury commented that there is some confusion and that this is a gray area of some understanding. (Following the meeting the Executive Director asked the DD/S to collect all relevant material pertaining to clearance procedures.)

Maury reported that [redacted] was in touch with Senator Gaylord Nelson's office with respect to his request for a briefing on Soviet/ChiCom weapons and military posture.

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The Director called attention to the Executive Director's memorandum of 17 April concerning the establishment of MAG. He noted that, in his judgment, the formation of this Group is well worth trying and may start a very useful dialogue between middle-grade officers and management. He noted that the success of the Group depends on the quality of personnel selected for participation and asked each Deputy Director and Office Head to be most thoughtful in their selections. The Director asked that all concerned render full support.

In response to the Director's question, Maury provided a brief outline of the material being prepared for his 23 April briefing of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee.



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L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer



Joseph Alsop

Soviet Marshals Prime Movers In Winter's Return to Prague

DURING the short-lived political springtime in Czechoslovakia, the American media enjoyed a sympathetic blossom-time. This country's ever-wishful academic intellectuals and their editorial allies assured everyone, over and over again, that spring in Prague meant that spring in Moscow could not be far away.

Today, however, icy winter has returned to Prague, by naked force of Soviet arms. At the point of a gun held by Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Czech government has been remade as Moscow desired. The last vestiges of freedom have been stamped out. The arrests have already begun.

For all its down-to-earth and pleading tone, the address to the Czech nation by the wretched Alexander Dubcek's replacement, the hard-nosed Gustav Husak, was in fact a threat of arrests on a mass scale. "Please submit without protest," Husak said in effect, "or we shall have to take far harsher measures."

It may be, of course, that Husak will be defied by the Czech students, or by the labor unionists, or by someone else. In that case, a great wave of political imprisonments can be rather confidently predicted. And in any case, it is plain that the Czech government now rests exclusively upon the power of the Soviet army, plus the power of the local secret police apparatus, which nowadays has Russian KGB-men conveniently stationed in every important back room.

YOU MIGHT have supposed then, that a whole series of icy lessons would be drawn from this grim turn of events. If it was logical to read a wider significance

into that long-gone spring in Prague, then it is far more logical to find this same kind of significance—but of course in reverse—in the Soviet reimposition of winter.

Instead, the loudest American interpreters of the Czech spring continue to speak and behave as though the Soviet Union were still happily evolving in a comfortable and encouraging way. Every factor in the equation has changed. No notice is being taken.

This is obvious self-deluding nonsense. At a minimum, if the Soviets insist on maintaining an airless police-empire in Eastern Europe, this must mean further Soviet evolution in the same depressing direction. Airless police empires can only be maintained, after all, by airless police states. That is the kind of government the President will probably confront, when and if he opens the expected negotiations with the Kremlin.

It does not end there, either. The evidence is strong, though not absolutely decisive, that the Soviet marshals were the prime movers in the Soviet decision to bring the winter back to Prague. Just that has been reported by the ablest of the American correspondents now in Moscow, Anatole Shub, of The Washington Post.

SHUB WENT further, quoting a highly placed Yugoslav to the effect that neither Alexei Kosygin nor anyone else mattered any longer in Moscow. All power, it was stated, was now concentrated in the hands of the two leading marshals, Grechko and Jakubovsky, plus their ally in the Presidium, Leonid Brezhnev.

Perhaps this unnamed Yugoslav was going a bit far—as of now. His thesis cannot be proved or disproved—as of now. What cannot be denied, however, is the obvious trend in Moscow. That trend is mainly marked by acquisition by the Soviet marshals of ever increasing leverage in all decisions that concern them.

That seems a modest formula. But for such decisions, these are not only the obvious areas of military concern arms control agreements; most of foreign policy, notably including the Middle East; and above all policy towards the Soviet empire.

In addition, the Soviet marshals' areas of concern conspicuously include the all-important internal apportionment of Soviet resources. And they even extend to the degree of freedom of expression in Russia, about which military leaders have repeatedly expressed angry indignation.

Just about all the American governmental analysts, despite widespread initial reluctance, now concede the increase in the Soviet marshal's leverage. Some say, more carefully, that the military now have a greater "bureaucratic weight"; but it comes to the same thing. And in this matter, the American analysts are still far more optimistic than others whose opinions deserve consideration.

Milovan Djilas has flatly predicted the effective militarization of the Soviet government before too many years have passed. The brilliant Michel Tatu, analyst of "Le Monde," has gone nearly as far. With respect to the Soviets, in short, it is time to stop, look and listen.